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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

vs.

:

Case No. 20030695-CA

JASON NOALL,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a jury's finding of guilty in the Second Judicial
District Court on the 7th day of May, 2003, and the Court's denial of
Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment on July 1, 2003, and sentencing on
July 15, 2003. The Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed on July
21,2003. A Notice of Appeal was filed on August 20, 2003. The Defendant
was convicted of theft, a second-degree felony. Jurisdiction for the appeal is
conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a3(2)(e)(2003).

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.
DID THE PROSECUTOR COMMIT MISCONDUCT
WHEN HE REFERRED TO MATTERS WHICH THE JURY
WASN'T JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING IN DETERMING
THEIR VERDICT?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In determining whether a given statement
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, the statement must be viewed in light of
the totality of the evidence presented at trial. See, State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d
925, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). This issue should be reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard of review. "The trial court's rulings on whether the
prosecutor's conduct merits a mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of
discretion." State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)(citations
omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
SIXTH AMENDMENT
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
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UTAH CODE
U.C.A. §76-6-404 Theft - Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rule 404(b) other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by information with theft, a second-degree
felony in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-404. (R.001). Following a preliminary
hearing, the Defendant pled not guilty and the case was set for a jury trial. (R.
015). Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine requesting that they be
allowed to introduce evidence of Defendant's prior bad acts under Rule 404(b)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (R. 020-27). A hearing was held on this
motion on May 1, 2003. The trial court denied the State's motion in limine. A
jury trial was held on May 7, 2003, in front of the Honorable Pamela G.
Heffernan. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. (R. 040).
On June 10, 2003, Defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment. (R. 09495). A hearing on said motion was held on July 1, 2003. The Defendant's
motion was denied. A written findings of fact, conclusions of law and order
was submitted and signed on July 15, 2003. (R. 121-24). The Defendant was
3

sentenced on July 15, 2003. He was sentenced to a term of one to fifteen years
at the Utah State Prison. The Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed
on July 21, 2003. (R. 125-26). The Defendant filed a notice of appeal on
August 20, 2003.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 17, 2002, three individuals went into J.W. Auto Sales in
Ogden, Utah. One of these individuals talked with a salesman, Thomas Salazar,
("Salazar") and indicated that he was interested in a sports utility vehicle
(SUV). (R. 146/52-54). Salazar showed the individual a SUV and told him the
price. The price was apparently too high so Salazar showed him an older
Chevrolet Blazer that was a lot less money. Salazar allowed the individual to
take this cheaper Blazer for a test drive. He did not obtain identification from
the person who took the Blazer for the test drive. (R. 146/57).
The vehicle wasn't returned to the lot so Salazar called the police. (R.
146/59). Salazar gave the police a description of the individual who drove off
in the vehicle. He was approximately six feet tall, and weighed between one
hundred and ninety and two hundred pounds. He had a goatee and his hair was
cut shorter on the bottom. (R. 146/60). At a later date, Detective Jeff Pickrell
of the Ogden Police Department showed Salazar a photo line-up.
Defendant's picture was included in that line-up.
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The

Salazar picked the

Defendant's picture and identified him as the individual who took the Blazer
for a test drive. (R. 146/61). Salazar testified at the Defendant's preliminary
hearing on November 12, 2002, and identified him as the individual who testdrove the vehicle. (R. 146/62). At the trial, Salazar testified that the Defendant
had a little grin or smirk that he had noticed when he interacted with him at the
car lot and that he noticed it again at the pre-trial. (R. 146/62-63).
Detective Jeff Pickrell ("Pickrell") of the Ogden Police Department
received information from a gang detective that a confidential informant gave
him some information concerning the Defendant. (R. 146/77-78). Defendant's
trial counsel objected to the statement coming in for the truth of the matter
asserted. The trial court instructed the jury that this information was coming in
for the limited purpose of explaining why the officer did what he did. (R.
146/78).
The prosecutor didn't ask Pickrell what information he had. Instead he
asked him, "From the information you got through the officer from the
confidential informant, what did you do with the information that the defendant
might be a suspect?" Id. Pickrell put together a photo line-up and took it to
Mr. Salazar to see if he could identify the Defendant. He included a picture of
the Defendant and five other similar appearing men. (R. 146/78-80). Salazar
picked the Defendant's picture out of this line up. (R. 146/83). The vehicle
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was recovered on October 2, 2002. At the time it was recovered it was being
driven by someone other than the Defendant. (R. 146/84).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial was violated when
the prosecutor referred to matters during his closing argument that the jury
wasn't justified in considering when determining their verdict. There had been
hearsay testimony admitted during the trial. This hearsay evidence allegedly
came to a gang detective through a confidential informant and indicated that
the Defendant was involved in the vehicle theft. This evidence was admitted
for the limited purpose of explaining why the detective took a photo line-up
with the Defendant's picture in it to the salesman at the car lot. The jury was
instructed that they could consider it for that limited purpose only.
Defendant's trial counsel argued in his closing argument that it was
possible that Defendant returned the vehicle and a third party stole it. The
prosecutor in his rebuttal pointed out that Pickrell didn't just pull the
Defendant's name out of a hat, but that he had a reason to put the Defendant's
picture in that photo line-up.
By arguing this evidence to the jury, the prosecutor caused the jury to
consider facts which they were not justified in considering in determining their
verdict.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT
WHEN HE REFERRED TO MATTERS WHICH THE JURY
WASN'T JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING IN DETERMING
THEIR VERDICT.
A prosecutor's remarks constitute misconduct and require a reversal if:
"(1) the questions or remarks called to the jury's attention matters which they
would not be justified in considering in reaching their verdict, and (2) under the
circumstances, the jury was probably influenced by the remarks." State v.
Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
To understand why the prosecutor's comments during his closing
argument constitute misconduct a review of the evidence is in order. Mr.
Salazar, the salesman at J.W. Auto Sales testified that the Defendant took a
SUV for a test drive. The prosecutor asked him when he became concerned
that the vehicle might not be coming back. (R. 146/58). Salazar answered that
when they (Defendant) left there was a white car parked on the curb.
Approximately forty-five minutes later, Salazar noticed that this white car was
gone. Id.

He assumed that the white car was the Defendant's, although he

didn't see him or his friends get out of it. (R. 146/59). The vehicle the
Defendant test drove was not returned and Salazar notified the police. (R.
146/60).
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This vehicle was recovered approximately two weeks later. It was being
driven by someone other than the Defendant. (R. 146/84). Detective Pickrell
testified that "[o]ne of the gang detectives came to me, and a confidential
informant had told him that --" (R. 146/77).

Defendant's trial attorney

interrupted and objected to this information coming in for the truth of the
matter asserted. Id. The prosecutor answered, "we have no objection to that,
your honor. We're offering it just to show why he put together the lineup, not
for the truth of the matter." Id.
The trial court then instructed the jury that this information was to be
admitted solely for the purpose of showing why the officer acted in the manner
he did.

(R. 146/77-78).

The following colloquy took place between the

prosecutor and Detective Pickrell.
Prosecutor: Based on that information, what did you do then?
Pickrell:

I - on the information I got from -

Prosecutor: Yes. From the information you got through the officer from
the confidential informant, what did you do with the
information that the defendant might be a suspect?
Pickrell:

I composed a photo lineup - (R. 146/78).

This double hearsay was extremely prejudicial towards the Defendant.
Especially considering that Detective Pickrell indicated that he received it from

8

a gang detective. However, Defendant's trial attorney allowed it to be admitted
for the limited purpose of explaining why Detective Pickrell took a photo lineup that included the Defendant's picture to Mr. Salazar.

The prosecutor

himself acknowledged that they were not introducing this evidence for the truth
of the matter asserted but only to show why Pickrell took the actions that he
did.
During closing argument, Defendant's trial attorney argued that;
"The person who does the talking seems interested in a particular
SUV, and they start talking price. That person gets hesitant when
you're talking about the price. I would submit that if the person is
going to steal a vehicle, he's not going to hesitate about the price
and say, I want to steal something cheaper. That's not going to be
going through his mind, the price of this was too much; I'm going
to steal a cheaper vehicle. So I would submit that is something
you can take into consideration on whether or not the State has
proved that the person who took the car for the test-drive was even
the same person who stole the vehicle.And Mr. Salazar doesn't get
any identification from this person, goes in and gets the keys,
gives him the keys, tells him to take it for a drive. No testimony
as to what the person was supposed to do when he came back,
whether he was supposed to talk to Mr. Salazar, where he
supposed to park the car, whatever. . . .
He (Salazar) doesn't
see it leave. That's when he first starts getting concerned, is when
he sees that white car is gone, cause he assumes that the people
who took the car for a test drive were riding in that white car. I
would submit there's a lot of things that happened that Mr. Salazar
never saw. The person who took the vehicle for a test drive could
have returned the car, could have left, and someone else could
have the stolen the car. . . . Like I say, if a person is going to
commit a theft of a vehicle, why is he going to be quibbling about
the price and want to steal the cheaper vehicle?" (R. 146/124-25).
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Defendant's attorney had already pointed out that the State carries the
burden of proving each element of their case beyond a reasonable doubt. In an
attempt to establish reasonable doubt, he pointed out some alternative
possibilities.
During the prosecutor's rebuttal portion of his closing argument he
responded by saying, "Again, recall that the detective didn't just pull his name
out of the hat. Okay. There was some reason to put together a full lineup with
his picture in there." (R. 146/127).
Defendant's attorney objected and pointed out that this evidence was
admitted for a limited purpose, merely to explain what the detective did. The
prosecutor then argued to the judge that "[h]e (Pickrell) had a reason to put
together a photo lineup, and he did. He didn't just come up with this name out
of a hat or because he didn't like Mr. Noall. I think it's relevant for that
purpose, to show that he had information to put it together - " (R. 146/128).
The trial judge stated "I think you need - "
The prosecutor interrupted her and said "—and that's all I'm going [to]
argue."
The trial judge then stated, "I think you need to very limit your argument
to that, though --" (R. 146/128).
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The trial judge apparently found the reference to this information
appropriate as she didn't sustain Defendant's objection and she didn't instruct
the jury to disregard the prosecutor's comments.
Prior to sentencing, Defendant's trial attorney filed a motion to arrest
judgment. (R. 094-95). One of the issues he raised in this motion was the
prosecutor's statement during his closing argument. There was a hearing on
this motion and the trial judge found that there was "no harm in allowing him
to argue during closing arguments what was already received into evidence for
that limited purpose." (R. 147/Tab 3/5). The court also signed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law that ruled the "information was admitted for a
limited purpose and the prosecutor's mention of that limited purpose in his
closing argument was not misconduct and was harmless." (R. 122).
Based on the above, the first part of the prosecutorial misconduct test is
met. "[D]id the remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters which they
would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict . . ." State v.
Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973). The prosecutor's remarks referred to the fact
that Detective Pickrell had information from a gang detective that the
Defendant had something to do with the theft of the vehicle.
The jury had been instructed that they were not to consider that
information for the truth of the matter asserted and that they were only to use
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that information to understand why the detective put together a photo line-up
with the Defendant's picture in it.

However, on the prosecutor's rebuttal

portion of his closing argument he argued that that "the detective didn't just
pull his name out of the hat. Okay. There was some reason to put together a
full lineup with his picture in there." (R. 146/127) He also stated in front of
the jury, "[h]e had a reason to put together the photo lineup, and he did. He
didn't just come up with this name out of a hat or because he didn't like Mr.
Noall." (R. 146/128).
There was only one message the jury could receive from this. Someone
had told a gang detective that the Defendant stole the vehicle. By arguing this
evidence in the rebuttal portion of his closing argument he improperly argued
facts that the jury could not consider when arriving at its verdict.
This information was not only hearsay, but double hearsay. Allowing
the prosecutor to argue that Detective Pickrell had a reason to put the
Defendant's picture in the photo line-up violated the Defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confront the witnesses. In State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108
(Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court stated that "if the declarant is not
present, the core values of the confrontation right are implicated because the
essence of the confrontation right is the opportunity to have the accusing
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witness in court and subject to cross-examination, so that bias and credibility
can be evaluated by the finder of fact." Id. at 1112.
In State v. Moosman, 19A P.2d 474 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme
Court held that "[i]f the evidence violates a defendant's right to confront
witnesses, it should not be admitted." Id. at 480. The Court then adopted a
two-part test to evaluate the extent of a violation of the right to confrontation.
Id. "First, we look at whether the State's presentation of hearsay testimony of
extrajudicial statements or occurrences is 'crucial to the state's case or
'devastating' to the defendant." Id. The second part of the test is "[sjecond,
we look at the availability of the declarant and whether the presence of the
declarant will add any probative value to the evidence by allowing the trier of
fact to observe the demeanor of the witness." Id.
The evidence that a gang detective told Detective Pickrell that a
confidential informant gave him information concerning the Defendant and the
stolen vehicle was "devastating" to the Defendant. The jury did not have the
benefit of knowing who this "confidential informant" was, what information he
or she had, how he/she obtained this information, whether there was any bias
on the part of the informant, or whether or not they had a criminal record. It
was certainly improper for the jury to be able to consider this information when
arriving at their verdict.

However, this is exactly what the prosecutor

13

encouraged them to do when he pointed out that Pickrell didn't pull the name
out of a hat and that he had a reason to include the Defendant's picture in that
photo line-up.
In deciding whether the second part of the prosecutor misconduct test is
met an appellate court should consider all of the evidence concerning a
defendant's guilt. See, State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984)("Step two
is more difficult and involves a consideration of the circumstances of the case
as a whole. In making such a consideration, it is appropriate to look at the
evidence of defendant's guilt."). "If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the
challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed prejudicial. Likewise, in a
case with less compelling proof, this Court will more closely scrutinize the
conduct." Id. (citations omitted).
The proof in the case at bar was not very strong. Three individuals went
to a car lot to test drive a Blazer. The Defendant thought the first SUV he was
shown was too expensive.

He then test-drove a cheaper one.

Forty-five

minutes later the salesman noticed that a white car he assumed the Defendant
arrived in was gone. He then reported the Blazer as stolen. Two weeks later
someone other than the Defendant was found driving the Blazer. There was no
evidence that the driver implicated the Defendant in any way. Nor was there
any physical evidence such as fingerprints that connected the Defendant to the

14

Blazer. The Defendant was convicted based on a photo line-up that was first
shown to Mr. Salazar and then months later by in court identifications when the
Defendant was the only person sitting in the Defendant's seat in the courtroom.
When this case is viewed in its entirety, the information from the gang
detective is the kind of evidence which "the jury would not be justified in
considering in determining their verdict . . ." Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426. When
the minimal evidence concerning the Defendant's guilt is considered, it
becomes clear that the jurors "were probably influenced by those remarks." Id,
For these reasons, the prosecutor committed reversible error when his remarks
called "to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified
in considering in determining their verdict. . . ." Id.

CONCLUSION
The Defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial was violated when the
prosecutor referred to the hearsay evidence during his closing argument. He
improperly argued facts that the jury could not consider when determining their
verdict. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to
reverse his conviction.
DATED this 2nd day of February 2004.

DEE W. SMITH
Attorney for Appellant
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I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
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this 2nd day of February, 2004.
DEE W.SMITH
Attorney at Law
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ADDENDUM A

L. DEAN SAUNDERS, UBN 6324
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377

SEC0KD DISTRICT COURT

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 021904790
JASON NO ALL,
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan

Defendant.

On May 7, 2003, defendant was convicted by a jury of the offense of Theft of Motor
Vehicle, a Second Degree Felony. On June 10, 2003, defendant filed a Motion to Arrest
Judgment under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court, having received
the briefs of counsel and heard the arguments of counsel as to Defendant's Motion to Arrest
Judgment, makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Defendant received a fair trial.
2. The jury verdict in this case was supported by highly substantial evidence.
3. The information from a confidential informant, and from the person found in the
vehicle, that defendant may have been the one who had taken the vehicle was admitted for the
limited purpose of showing why defendant was added to the photo line-up as a suspect.
4. The Court appropriately instructed the jury concerning how the jury should view this

121

information about defendant. The prosecutor's mention of that information and its limited
purpose in closing argument was not misconduct and was harmless.
5. Based on the totality of the evidence in this case, the testimony of the eyewitness and
the circumstances of his contact with defendant, and the demeanor of the witnesses when they
testified, there is no reasonable likelihood that jury verdict would have been any different.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Defendant received a fair trial.
2. Defendant has failed to set forth any grounds to support a motion to arrest judgment.
3. The evidence presented at trial did constitute a public offense.
4. The verdict of the jury was supported by highly substantial evidence.
5. The Court appropriately instructed the jury how to view the information about
defendant being a possible suspect. That information was admitted for a limited purpose and the
prosecutor's mention of that limited purpose in his closing argument was not misconduct and
was harmless.
6. Based on the totality of the evidence in this case, the testimony of the eyewitness and
the circumstances of his contact with defendant, and the demeanor of the witnesses when they
testified, there is no reasonable likelihood that jury verdict would have been any different

Approved as to form:

Attorney for Defendant

Deputy Weber County Attorney

2
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ORDER
Wherefore, Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgement is Denied.

DATED this

[j

day of July, 2003

PAMEEAG. HEFFERNAN
District Court Judge

3
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and order was hand delivered or mailed, postage pre-paid, to:
Martin Gravis
Attorney for Defendant
2562 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401

DATED this J_^_ day of July, 2003.
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
APP SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 021904790 FS

JASON NOALL,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
July 15, 2003

PRESENT
Clerk:
roxanneb
Prosecutor: L. DEAN SAUNDERS
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARTIN GRAVIS, PDA
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 30, 1974
Video
Tape Number:
H071503
Tape Count: 3 03

CHARGES
1. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
- Disposition: 05/07/2003 Guilty
HEARING
This is the time set for sentencing. Defendant is present in
custody from the Weber County Jail. Defendant is represented by
Martin Gravis.

Page 1

1 or

Case No: 021904790
Date:
Jul 15, 2003
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison,
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The court orders sentence imposed to run concurrent with sentence
defendant is currently serving; all to be served at the Utah State
Prison.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The court recommends defendant receive credit for time served since
05/07/03. The court also recommends restitution in the amount of
$2,951.00 be collected as a condition of parole.

Dated this

day of

JLf
1

PAMELX G^H^FFERNAN
District Court Judge

Page 2 (last)

12G

ADDENDUM B

1

A

2

on it.

3

thing, to let — let him know we'd put out ATL's.

4

out a weekly new bulletin to the surrounding agencies, the cars

5

that I'm looking for.

6
7

Q

Essentially at first it's — I didn't have any leads
It was — I went down and talked to Mr. Salazar, a PR
And I sent

Did you review the physical description that

Mr. Salazar gave originally?

8

A

I did.

9

Q

What was that, if you recall?

10

A

A white male, I believe in the early twenties, about

11

six-one, 200 pounds.

12

Q

Okay.

13

A

I got a lead.

14

One of the gang detectives came to me,

and a confidential informant had told him that —

15
16

Just describe what happened next on the case.

MR. GRAVIS:

Your Honor, I'm going to object to this

coming in for the truth of the matter asserted.

17

MR. SAUNDERS:

We have no objection to that, your

18

Honor.

19

lineup, not for the truth of the matter.

20
21
22

We're offering it just to show why he put together the

MR. GRAVIS:

I'd like the Court to instruct the jury

what's going on so they understand.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Basically, it's preparatory

23

information as to the information the officer put together to

24

display to the witness, and you'll hear more about the details

25

of what that is.

Any preparatory comments as to what - why he
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1

did what he did are solely admitted for the purpose of showing

2

why he did what he did, as opposed to any kind of truth of the

3

matter asserted.

4

but that's essentially what it is.

5

purpose only, and when I instructed you originally that some

6

evidence may come in for a limited purpose only, this is one of

7

those.

8

to indicate why he did what he did.

9
10

Q

Hopefully you understand that instruction,
It comes in for a limited

It's just coming in solely as a preparatory statement

(BY MR. SAUNDERS)

Okay?

Based on that information, what

did you do then?

11

A

I — on the information I got from —

12

Q

Yes.

From the information you got through the

13

officer from the confidential informant, what did you do with

14

the information that the defendant might be a suspect?

15

A

I composed a photo lineup —

16

Q

Okay.

17

A

— took it back down to Mr. Salazar.

18
19

MR. SAUNDERS:
Honor?

20
21
22

May I approach the witness, your

THE COURT:
Q

Yes, you may.

(BY MR. SAUNDERS)

Showing you what's been marked as

State's proposed Exhibit No. 1, do you recognize this?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

what is that?

25

A

My photo lineup.
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1

vehicle, and I would submit they haven't even proved that.

2

Mr. Salazar testified that when he first observed the

3

three people, they were over on this northeast side of the car

4

lot.

5

were driving.

6

down here, that that's what they arrived in, but he never saw

7

them walk across the car lot.

8

arrived in the same vehicle.

He hadn't observed them arrive.

He didn't know what they

He assumed they were parked in this white car

He doesn't know whether they

9

There's no testimony how they arrived, whether the

10

three people arrived together or separately, two in one car,

11

one in another, whatever.

12

already on the parking lot.

13

arrived in this white car parked over here on 33rd Street.

14

He doesn't see them until they're
He assumes later on that they

The person who does the talking seems interested in a

15

particular SUV, and they start talking price.

That person gets

16

hesitant when you're talking about the price.

I would submit

17

that if the person is going to steal a vehicle, he's not going

18

to hesitate about the price and say, I want to steal something

19

cheaper.

20

price of this was too much; I'm going to steal a cheaper

21

vehicle.

22

That's not going to be going through his mind, the

So I would submit that is something you can take into

23

consideration on whether or not the State has proved that the

24

person who took the car for the test-drive was even the same

25

person who stole the vehicle.
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1

And Mr. Salazar doesn't get any identification from

2

this person, goes in and gets the keys, gives him the keys,

3

tells him to take it for a drive.

4

person was supposed to do when he came back, whether he was

5

supposed to talk to Mr. Salazar, where he supposed to park the

6

car, whatever.

7

33rd Street over here where the building is.

8

office is here; there's a couple of offices here.

9

places around here where he testifies that this car sometime

10
11

No testimony as to what the

We know the entrance to the car lot is on
Mr. Salazar's
There are

leaves forty-five minutes to an hour later.
He doesn't see it leave.

That's when he first starts

12

getting concerned, is when he sees that white car is gone,

13

^cause he assumes that the people who took the car for a test

14

drive were riding in that white car.

15

lot of things that happened that Mr. Salazar never saw.

16

person who took the vehicle for a test drive could have

17

returned the car, could have left, and someone else could have

18

stolen the car.

19

people that could have arrived in two separate vehicles/ when

20

the other two people may have taken the car after the person

21

who took the test drive left.

22

to commit a theft of a vehicle, why is he going to be quibbling

23

about the price and want to steal the cheaper vehicle?

24
25

I would submit there's a
The

It could have been with one of the other two

Like I say, if a person is going-

Now, Mr. Saunders gets a chance to get back up here
and make an argument, what's called rebuttal argument.

That's
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1

because the State has the burden of proof.

I don't get a

2

chance to get back up and make another argument after he's

3

done.

4

reasonable doubt.

He will get up here and tell you why this is not a

5

But the testimony that comes from Mr. Salazar as to

6

what happened here, things that happened that he never

7

observed, and the State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

8

that he stole the vehicle.

9

Mr. Noall is the person who took the car for a test drive — and

Like I say, even if you believe

10

we're not conceding that supposition; he's not — because they

11

haven't identified him properly.

12

evidence to identify him; maybe it's a mistaken identity.

13

even if you believe he is, the State still has to prove that if

14

he took the car for a test drive, he's still the person who

15

stole it.

And there's not enough
But

16

And I would submit that there's too many holes left

17

in this case, that the State has failed to present sufficient

18

evidence for you to go back to the jury room and find him

19

guilty.

20
21

Thank you.
MR. SAUNDERS:

photo lineup.

I want to talk a little bit about this

You'll get a chance to look at it.

22

May I approach the jury a little closer, your Honor?

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. SAUNDERS:

25

You can look at this.

You may.
Thank you.
To me it appears that number 1
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1

has some facial hair on this chin.

Number 2 has facial hair.

2

Number 3 appears to have facial hair.

3

facial hair.

4

if that's a shadow or if that appears to be facial hair on his

5

face.

Number 4 appears to have

Number 5, I'll leave that to you.

I can't tell

Number 6 has facial hair.

6

Go through there and ask yourself, is this photo

7

lineup by itself suggesting to Mr. Salazar that he pick

8

Mr. Noall?

9

the detective didn't just pull his name out of the hat.

I would submit that it is not.

Again, recall that
Okay.

10

There was some reason to put together a full lineup with his

11

picture in there.

12

I want to talk a little bit about —

13

MR. GRAVIS:

Your Honor, I'm going to object to that.

14

That's his burden, that there's evidence, that that evidence

15

was admitted for a limited purpose and not that the defendant

16

committed the crime.

The jury's not —

17

MR. SAUNDERS:

Your Honor, you instructed them on -

18

MR. GRAVIS:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. SAUNDERS:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. GRAVIS:

~ not allowed to consider Just a minute.

Let him finish.

You instructed -

Just a minute.
The jury's not allowed to consider it,

23

and he's not allowed to argue it.

I would submit that he's

24

arguing evidence that was admitted for a limited purpose,

25

merely to explain what the defendant did, is somehow evidence
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1

the defendant has committed the crime.

2

that purpose, and it's improper to argue that,

3

MR. SAUNDERS:

It was not admitted for

That's not true, your Honor.

We

4

admitted it for the purpose to show the reason the detective

5

did what he did.

6

and told them it was admitted for a limited purpose.

7

arguing anything other than that.

8

together the photo lineup, and he did.

9

with this name out of a hat or because he didn't like

The Court explained to them that instruction

He had a reason to put
He didn't just come up

10

Mr. Noall.

11

that he had information to put it together —

I think it's relevant for that purpose, to show

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. SAUNDERS:

14

THE COURT:

15

I think you need - and that's all I'm going argue.

I think you need to very limit your

argument to that, though —

16

MR. SAUNDERS:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. SAUNDERS:

19

I'm not

Okay.

- specifically.
That's what my argument was, too, your

Honor.

20

I want to talk about this theory of Mr. Gravis's a

21

little.

Maybe the person that took it did take it back, and

22

somehow somebody else stole it.

23

was there on the lot.

24

people that came and talked about vehicles.

25

them.

Mr. Salazar testified that he

He did go inside.

Nobody else test-drove.

There were other
He spoke with

He was there on the lot.

He

128

